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Products Liability and Medical
Devices: Diagnosis and Cure
I. Introduction
His heart was quivering and beating feebly; his blood pres-
sure and pulse rate were sinking; his skin was blue from lack of
oxygen. Then Barney Clark was given a unique chance to live.
Surgeons at the University of Utah Medical Center removed his
worn-out heart and replaced it with a gleaming plastic and alumi-
num device-the first completely artificial heart to be permanently
implanted in a human being.'
Today, approximately one hundred and fifty medical devices2
or implants are available to replace broken-down or diseased parts
of the body.3 Products planted internally range from heart valves
and pacemakers to total joint replacements. In the wake of what has
been called a "biomedical engineering explosion,"4 the medical de-
vice industry has grown to an estimated 1100 companies, producing
12,000 different types of devices, with total annual retail sales of five
billion dollars. 5
Medical devices, like all man's inventions, are subject to mal-
function, failure, and decay.6 Unlike most products, however, medi-
1. An Incredible Affair of the Heart, NEWSWEEK, December 13, 1982, at 70.
2. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified
at 21 U.S.C.A. § 360c-360k (West Supp. 1981)) [hereinafter cited as Medical Device Amend-
ments] contain an expanded definition of the term "device" which provides in pertinent part,
as follows:
The term 'device'. .. means an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contri-
vance implant, . . . or other similar or related article, including any component part,
or accessory, which is...
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease . . . or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man ...
which does not achieve any of its principal intended purposes through chemical ac-
tion within or on the body of man. . . and which is not dependent upon being me-
tabolized for the achievement of any of its principal intended purposes.
21 U.S.C.A. § 321(h) (West Supp. 1981). Thus, "medical devices," as used in this article, refers
to manufactured devices intentionally implanted inside the human body for extended periods
of time. The term does not include blood and human tissue, medical instruments used exter-
nally on the body, medical instruments unintentionally left in the body following surgery, or
drugs.
3. Schreiber, Medical Implants and the Law, MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 445 (1982).
4. Morris, Physician and Hospital Liability for Defective Products Used in the Treatment
of Patients, 46 INS. COUNS. J. 566 (1979).
5. Foote, Loops and Loopholes. Hazardous Device Regulation Under the 1976 Medical
Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 101, 103 n.8 (1978).
6. In 1970, a federal survey of the preceding ten year period revealed 10,000 injuries
cal devices surgically implanted in the human body pose unique
dangers.7 Risks arise both from the mechanical attributes of the im-
planted device and from the material out of which the device is con-
structed. Because they are foreign to the human body, medical
implants possess the potential to cause injury and death by interact-
ing with the body's natural chemistry.' While many of these reactive
dangers are known, many are unknown and unknowable.' Conse-
quently, all implants must be considered potentially hazardous from
both a medical and legal viewpoint.
A personal injury or wrongful death lawsuit arising from the
use of a medical device inevitably presents complex legal and tech-
nological issues.' ° Suits often involve a claim against the manufac-
turer for alleged negligence in design or manufacture, failure to
warn, breach of warranty, or strict liability. " Typically joined with
such claims is a claim against the hospital based on alleged negli-
gence and a claim against the implanting surgeons or attending phy-
sicians based on alleged medical malpractice.'
2
This article initially discusses the unique problems encountered
from medical devices including 731 deaths. Five hundred and twelve of the deaths were due to
defective heart valves alone. Medical Device Amendments of 1975: Hearings on HR. 5545,
H.R. 974, and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (statement of Representative
Fred B. Rooney) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Device Hearings]. Failure of cardiac pacemakers
has also caused harm. Since 1972, 22,310 pacemakers have been recalled, many of which
exhibited the problem of "shunting" due to the accumulation of moisture on the pacemakers'
circuitry. Sagall, LegalAspects of Cardiac Pacemakers, 10 TRIAL 57 (1974). The present in-
dustry failure rate is .1%. While this percentage is small in itself, it represents an imposing
number of malfunctions when applied to the millions of implants in use. Bases, Prosthetic
Device Failure-Product Liability or Malpractice, 26 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 221 (1976). See
also Cooper, Device Legislation, 26 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 165, 170 (1971).
7. Examples of internal medical device problems include induced variance in the pop-
pets or ball valves of heart valves causing malfunction or total escape leading to sudden death;
metal implants corroding to release electrolytes causing tissue inflammation; plastic covered
bone pins leaking toxic polyvinylchloride into the blood stream; silicone breast implants in-
ducing chemical reaction infections and gangrene. COMPLAINT FILE ON IMPLANTED DEVICES,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Janu-
ary 17, 1983.
8. For example, vitallium, one of the most commonly used implant alloys, is a cobalt-
based substance generally regarded as inert. A recent study, however, found that vitallium
discs implanted subcutaneously in rats induce cancer. Likewise, metal implants commonly
used in orthopedic repair can corrode living tissue or disintegrate themselves, causing the infil-
tration of fragments into the body. For further examples see Implanted Devices That Have
Posed Problems, 121 CONG. REC. 10689 (1975) (placed in the record by Sen. Nelson).
9. Much is still unknown about the hazards associated with implantation of foreign
matter into the human body. For years adverse reaction reports were so inadequate that the
link between certain substances and an adverse human reaction went undetected. See gener-
ally Foote, supra note 5, at 104-06.
10. Roserm, Litigation Involving Manufacturer's Liability for Defective Medical Products.-
Judicial Perspectives, 2 AM. J.L. MED., 145 (1977).
II. Note, An Overview of Litigation Concerning Products Liability and Medical Devices, 5
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 309, 311 (1982).
12. There has been a substantial increase in the number of medical device products lia-
bility suits over the past two decades. The manufacturer of the device has replaced the physi-
cian as the most frequently named defendant. Disposition of the cases is evenly split between
plaintiffs and defendants. See D. GINGERICH, MEDICAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5-6 (1981).
when litigating a medical products liability suit under the three theo-
ries currently applied by the courts. The need for a uniform ap-
proach in products liability will be illustrated, followed by a critique
of the adequacy of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act as a
uniform standard. Finally, a two part proposal for overcoming the
product liability quagmire will be suggested.
II. Background
.4. Theories of Recovery
1. Negligence. -Early products liability cases generally were
predicated upon a negligence theory.'" Negligence is still the only
theory of recovery that consistently and successfully has been as-
serted against all three classes of defendants: manufacturer, hospi-
tal, and physician. When an injured plaintiff seeks recovery based
on the negligence of the medical device manufacturer, the plaintiff
must show that the manufacturer departed from standards of due
care required in design, manufacture,'4 assembly, packaging, testing,
inspecting for defects,' 5 warning, or adequately instructing.' 6 Physi-
cians and hospitals also may be subject to liability for negligence
through medical malpractice actions, and may be liable for negligent
misuse of the product, 17 negligent selection of the product,'" failure
13. New theories have diminished the importance of proving negligence, but the doctrine
is still widely used. Theories of warranty and strict liability have gained acceptance in recent
years, at least when applied against the medical device manufacturer. See generally Swartz,
Products Liability: Manufacturer's Responsibilityfor Defective or Negligently Designed Medical
and Surgical Instruments, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 348 (1969). Negligence has been defined as a
violation of the duty to use care with respect to a person to whom a duty of care is owed. W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971). The duty is often cast in terms of the
"reasonable" or "prudent" man, a mythical character of the legal arena. It has been stated
that negligence is the performance of an act that a person of ordinary prudence would not
have done in the same or similar circumstances, or the failure to do something that a person of
ordinary prudence would have done in the same or similar circumstances. See D. GINGERICH,
supra note 12, at 18-19. See also Posner, Implantable Medical Devices and Products Liability,
MED. TRIAL TECH. 255, 266 (1982).
14. See, e.g., Clark v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 290 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1961); Orthopedic Equip-
ment Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960) (intrameduflary nails); see also Liberatore v.
National Cylinder Gas Co., 193 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
15. Mitchiner v. Wright Mfg. Co. (W.D. Ind. 1959) (unreported but summarized in 6
LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 42.33) (hip prosthesis); Hine v. Fox, 89 So. 2d 13 (Fla.
1956) (electrocautery instrument).
16. See McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407, 181
N.E.2d 430 (1962).
17. See infra notes 18-20.
18. Cf. Philipps v. Powell, 210 Cal. 39, 290 P. 441 (1930), in which the injury resulted
from the breakage of a scalpel during a tracheotomy. The doctor admitted that the scalpel he
used was not the proper one for the particular operation. His failure to select and use what he
knew or should have known was the correct instrument was held to be negligent malpractice.
Id. Today, with such complex devices and instruments, physicians may be unable to distin-
guish between a sound and a defective product. The duty of selection is limited to meeting the
reasonable standards of the profession. Cf. Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chem. Works, 53 Tenn. App.
218, 381 S.W.2d 563 (1964).
to inspect or test the product,' 9 or using the product with knowledge
of its defective condition.2"
Although the negligence theory is available against all potential
defendants, it is totally inadequate as a vehicle of recovery for a pa-
tient injured by a surgical implant. To prove negligence against the
manufacturer or retailer, the patient-plaintiff must accomplish two
often impossible tasks. First, plaintiff must trace the product
through the entire production and distribution chain to discover the
source of the defect. 2' Second, a specific act of negligence among the
myriad activities of manufacturing hundreds of identical items must
be identified.22 Even if these difficult hurdles can be overcome,23 the
manufacturer is often insulated from suit by jurisdictional or proce-
dural barriers.24
Similarly, lack of due care by the physician is usually very diffi-
cult to prove. Negligence of a professional cannot be proven without
expert testimony offered by comparable professionals.25 Often it is
impossible to procure the necessary testimony because of the well-
known reluctance of doctors to testify against each other.26 Without
this testimony, the mere showing that an accident occurred will not
carry the burden for a negligence action 27 against either a doctor or a
19. The duty of doctors to inspect the equipment they use generally extends only to pat-
ent or discoverable defects. South Highlands Infirmary v. Camp, 279 Ala. 1, 180 So. 2d 904
(1965). The hospital, however, can be held liable for less obvious defects. See, e.g., Nelson v.
Swedish Hospital, 241 Minn. 551, 64 N.W.2d 38 (1954).
20. In Shepherd v. McGinnis, 257 Iowa 35, 131 N.W.2d 475 (1964), the plaintiff devel-
oped an infection due to contaminated sutures furnished by the hospital and used by the doc-
tor. Moreover, the doctor had used the product numerous times before and had experienced
similar problems. Consequently, both the hospital and doctor were found negligent. Id at 40,
131 N.W.2d at 478.
21. See Note, supra note i1, at 311-12.
22. Id
23. Often it is difficult or impossible to locate the manufacturer. See, e.g., Britt v.
Arvanitis, 590 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1978) (identity of manufacturer was unknown when suit was
brought and not discovered until the statute of limitations had expired); Magrine v. Spector,
100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968), af'd, 53 N.J. Super. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969);
Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967) (there was nothing to indicate
who manufactured the product anywhere in the doctor's records; tracing the origin of the
needle proved to be impossible).
24. See, e.g., Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F. Supp. 1088
(N.D.N.Y. 1977) (statute of limitations); Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 364
N.E.2d 1215 (1977) (statute of limitations); Gill v. Surgitool, Inc., 256 Cal. App. 2d 583, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 207 (1967) (manufacturer not doing business in the state).
25. Because juries composed of laymen normally are incompetent to pass judgment on
questions of medical science or technique, it has been held in a great majority of malpractice
cases that there can be no finding of negligence in the absence of expert testimony. See, e.g.,
Shea v. Phillips, 213 Ga. 269, 98 S.E.2d 552 (1957); Beane v. Perley, 99 N.H. 309, 109 A.2d 848
(1954). See generally Morris, The Role ofExpert Testimony in the Trial ofNegligence Issues, 26
TEX. L. REV. 1 (1947).
26. See Hilldin v. Peterson, 39 Wis. 2d 668, 159 N.W.2d 738 (1968); Morgan v. Rosen-
berg, 370 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. 1963). Kelner, The Medical Conspiracy of Silence, 87 CASE AND
COMMENT 10-11 (1982); Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16
CATH. U. L. REV. 187 (1966); Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 520
(1965).
27. A doctor is negligent only if he fails to possess and exercise the reasonable and ordi-
hospital.28
2. Warranty. -The breach of warranty theory recently has
gained wide approval in the medical product liability field.29 A war-
ranty action is contractual in nature and lies in the representations,
express or implied, that a seller makes about the product. Because
negligence need not be shown, the burden of proof upon the injured
plaintiff is less onerous.3°
In the past, privity requirements often hindered suits against
manufacturers for breach of express31 or implied
32 warranties. 33
Pacemakers, for example, generally come with an express warranty
providing for replacement of defective pacemakers with new ones
from the same manufacturer. These warranties, however, are rarely
seen by the patient. Moreover, the decision concerning which brand
pacemaker to use is always made either by the consulting physician,
the implanting surgeon, or the hospital.34 Under these circumstances
it is impossible for the patient to be aware of, much less to rely on,
the warranty. Lack of privity is no longer a bar to recovery against a
manufacturer in most jurisdictions. Courts have circumvented this
impediment by considering the doctor to be the agent of the patient
for purposes of reliance.35
nary degree of learning, skill and care commonly possessed and exercised by reputable physi-
cians practicing in the same or similar locality in the care of similar cases. For a detailed
article on the applicable standard of care in medical malpractice cases see McCoid, The Care
Required ofMedical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549 (1959). For a discussion of malprac-
tice of doctors and hospitals relating to medical equipment see Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 1068
(1971).
28. See generally Rubin, Hospital and Professional User's Liabilityfor Defective Medical
Equipment, 8 AKRON L. REV. 99, 101-04 (1974). See also infra notes 76-78 and accompanying
text.
29. D. GINGERICH, supra note 12, at 20.
30. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
31. The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313 defines express warranties as statements
or affirmations of fact tending to induce purchase. The U.C.C. provides that express warran-
ties may be furnished by the seller by (1) any affirmations of fact or promise relating to the
goods that becomes a part of the basis of the sale; (2) a description of the goods made part of
the basis of the sale; or (3) a sample or model made part of the basis of the sale. Id The
causal relation between the statements and the purchase often presents problems in implant
related cases. See Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (plaintiff unable
to recover from manufacturer or assembler due to lack of privity). But see cases cited infra
note 35.
32. Implied warranties accompany the sale of an article without any express conduct on
the part of the seller. There are two types of implied warranties: merchantability and fitness
for a particular purpose. See U.C.C. § 2-314 and § 2-215. See also infra.
33. The concept of privity is derived from the nature of the warranty action itself. A
warranty is a form of covenant, running from the seller to the buyer, that induces a sale. See
supra note 31. If there has been no direct transaction between two parties, they are not in
privity of contract. Thus there is no logical basis upon which the one may be required to
perform the contract for the other, unless the contract has been made expressly for the benefit
of the plaintiff or has been made by one deemed to be an agent of the plaintiff. For a general
discussion of privity in tort and contract see W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 622-27.
34. Posner, supra note 13, at 266.
35. See, e.g., Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F. Supp. 1088
(N.D.N.Y. 1977); Friedman v. Medtronics Inc., 42 App. Div. 2d 185, 345 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1973).
Although both express and implied warranty are now available
as an avenue of recovery from the manufacturer, the injured plaintiff
still faces serious obstacles. For example, a warranty cannot be en-
forced unless it can be traced to a source.36 Furthermore, many
courts refuse to extend breach of warranty theories to doctors or
even to hospitals. 37 The logic of this refusal is questionable.38
An injured plaintiff seeking to recover against a hospital has
two implied warranties available: fitness for a particular purpose
39
and merchantability.4" Under the warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose, the plaintiff must show that the hospital is a "seller of
goods."'" This term embraces a significantly narrower group than
does the term "merchant" 42 required for the warranty of
merchantability. One can be a merchant not only by dealing in
goods, but also by holding himself out, by occupation or otherwise,
as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods in-
volved.4 3 The language of U.C.C. § 2-104 implies that a hospital
would be a merchant due to its special knowledge or skill, thus giv-
36. This often proves to be an impossible task. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
37. Reasons typically given for refusing to extend breach of warranty theories to physi-
cians or hospitals include the following: (1) Incidental furnishing of supplies or equipment
during the course of medical treatment does not constitute a buyer-seller relationship neces-
sary to support such theories; and (2) medical care and treatment is a single entity and may not
be broken down to label some parts of it sales and some parts of it contracts for services; and
(3) when the entity is actually directed to a restoration of the patient's health, the whole con-
tract is characterized as one for services. See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 258, 263 (1973);see
also Cheshire v. Southhampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1967); Cutler v.
General Elec. Co., 4 U.C.C.R.S. 300 (N.Y. 1967) (surgical insertion of pacemaker not a sales
transaction covered by sales provisions of the U.C.C.); Dorfman v. Austenal Inc., 3 U.C.C.R.S.
856 (N.Y. 1966); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
38. See supra note 37 and infra note 44 and accompanying text.
39. U.C.C. § 2-315 (emphasis added), as adopted in most states, provides that the im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises,
[W]here the seller, at the time of contracting, has reason to know of any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill and judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is . . . an implied war-
ranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
40. U.C.C. § 2-314 (emphasis added), as adopted by most states, represents the implied
warranty of merchantability and provides that,
[u]nless modified by § 2-316, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is im-
plied in a contract for sale fthe seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind
The two implied warranties are often confused, even by the courts. J. WHITE AND R. SUM-
MERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-9 (1972) [hereinafter cited as J. WHITE]. Sections 2-
314 and 2-315 make it clear that warranty for aparticular purpose is narrower, more specific,
and more precise then warranty of merchantability, which involves fitness for the ordinary
purpose of the goods. See infra note 47.
41. U.C.C. § 2-103 defines seller as a person who sells or contracts to sell goods.
42. U.C.C. § 2-104 defines "merchant" as:
[A] person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds him-
self out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction, or to whom such knowledge or skill can be attributed by his employment
of an agent . . ..
43. Id
ing rise at least to an implied warranty of merchantability."
The plaintiff need not prove negligence to recover under an im-
plied warranty of merchantability theory. What must be shown is
that the defendant deviated from the standard of merchantability
and that this deviation caused the plaintiff's injury both proximately
and in fact.4 5 These necessities of proof make the merchantability
case rife with pitfalls closely related to those encountered in a negli-
gence lawsuit.46 More important, many goods that are perfectly
merchantable would not pass the fitness for a particular purpose
test.47 It therefore is extremely important that this more precise rem-
edy be available to plaintiffs in medical device cases. Courts in the
past overwhelmingly have refused to make the finding that hospitals
are "sellers of goods" necessary to sustain the fitness warranty.48
The rationale for this refusal is that a patient does not truly contract
to buy goods from a hospital during his or her stay there. A patient
in a hospital contracts for medical care and services, and drugs,
medicine, and devices charged to the patient by the hospital are
merely incidental to the services provided.49 Notwithstanding the
fact that the total transaction is part sale and part service, the major-
ity rule continues to be that "the essence of a hospital stay is the
furnishing of . . .healing services which may include incidental
sales of medicine and the like."50
In 1980, the long-standing approach to hybrid sales/service
44. See Comment, Hospital Liability-Seller of a Product or Provider of Services-Is the
Distinction Necessary, 23 S. TEX. L.J. 397 (1982).
45. Under U.C.C. § 2-314, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) That a
merchant sold the goods; and (2) that the goods were not merchantable at the time of sale; and
(3) the injury or damages to the plaintiff or his property; and (4) that the injury was caused
proximately and in fact by the defective nature of the goods; and (5) that the seller received
notice of the injury.
46. The plaintiff can fail on any of the points listed above or succumb to any affirmative
defenses that the defendant may raise. Furthermore, a merchantability case is likely to be
more difficult for the plaintiff than an express warranty case. Implied warranties are more
easily disclaimed, and proof of breach of an explicit warranty is likely to be easier than proof
of breach of the standard of merchantability. See J. WHITE supra note 40, at § 9-6.
47. Cf. Kobeckis v. Budzko, 225 A.2d 418 (Maine, 1967), in which pork infected with
trichinosis was not unmerchantable since cooking of even infected meat renders it safe for
human consumption. If the plaintiff, who contracted trichinosis after eating the seller's raw
pork, had proven that the seller knew he was a sausage maker and that sausage makers cus-
tomarily taste raw pork, he would nevertheless have made out a cause of action for breach of
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Id.
48. Compare Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954)
(blood transfusion is service transaction not subject to implied warranties) with Russell v.
Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1966), a,#'das modifed, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla.
1967) (commercial blood banks may be held liable for breach of warranty because transaction
is arguably a sale).
49. But cf. Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 285 A.2d 697 (1969), in which it was
held that hair solution applied in conjunction with hair permanent and beauty treatment con-
stituted a sale of goods under U.C.C. Article Two warranty provisions.
50. Potts v. W.Q. Richards Memorial Hosp., 558 S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
See also Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973);
Cheshire v. Southhampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1967); Goetz v.
Wadley Institute and Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
transactions was successfully challenged in Providence Hospital v.
Truly. 5 ' The court in Truly held that medicine and other products
incidental to the provision of medical services were products sold by
the seller-hospital to the buyer-patient.5 2 The hospital was found li-
able for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.53
A patient injured by a medical device may be able to, and
should, use the breach of warranty theory against both the manufac-
turer and the hospital or physician. The challenge in the former
cause of action is in isolating the manufacturer.54 The challenge in
the latter cause of action is in convincing the court that the warran-
ties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose logically
should apply to physicians and hospitals.55
3. Strict Liability in Tort, Restatement (Second) of Torts
402,4.-As compared to those brought on warranty theories, rela-
tively few implant cases have been brought which rely specifically on
a strict liability theory.56 Strict liability means that a seller of a prod-
51. 611 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). In Truly, the plaintiff had Miochol injected
into her eye by a medical doctor as part of a surgical procedure. The Miochol had become
contaminated when the circulating nurse, a hospital employee, sterilized the vial containing
the drug with a standard germicide. Id.
52. Id at 131.
53. The court relied on the fact that medicine and drugs were not expressly excluded
from U.C.C. § 2-316 as medical services and thus should not be excluded from the implied
warranty provisions of U.C.C. § 2-314 and § 2-315. 611 S.W.2d at 133. U.C.C. § 3-316 states
that,
(e) The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to
furnishing of human blood, human blood plasma, or other human tissue or organs
from a blood bank . . . . Such blood, plasma, tissue or organs. . . shall be consid-
ered as medical services.
The court used the rule of statutory construction that specific exceptions stated by a legislature
makes plain the intention that the statute should apply in all cases not excepted. 611 S.W.2d at
133.
54. To make warranty a truly viable theory of recovery against the manufacturer, it has
been suggested that hospitals be required to maintain an "Implanted Device Control Center."
Morris, supra note 4, at 571. Ideally, such a system would be computerized and would contain
a list of all devices implanted in each patient at that hospital; its type and location in the body;
its serial number; its manufacturer; its date of implant; the identity of the implanting surgeon;
the identity of the patient's attending physician; and the patient's hospital chart number. Any
subsequent information concerning the device, like recall notices, could be matched with the
information in the computer for timely notice and necessary action.
55. This is especially true when the manufacturer cannot be located and the hospital has
failed to maintain adequate records of the source of the implanted device. See infra notes 79-
80 and accompanying text.
56. Posner, supra note 13, at 260. The most widely accepted formulation of the doctrine
of strict liability is that found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) which
provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user. . . is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate user...
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product; and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user. . . without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although,
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product; and
uct may be held liable even though he has exercised all possible care
in the preparation and sale of a product.57 The sole prerequisite of
liability under a strict liability theory is the existence of a "defect"
rendering a product unreasonably dangerous and a causal connec-
tion between that defect and the injury resulting from the use of the
product.58
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts requires that
the "defect" render the product "unreasonably dangerous." The
majority of courts that apply strict liability include this require-
ment.59 However, courts have proposed widely differing definitions
of "unreasonably dangerous,"6 and some have entirely eliminated
the requirement, holding that proof of a defect renders the product
unreasonably dangerous. 61 Thus, one of the basic problems in prod-
uct liability litigation is that there is no generally accepted definition
of the term "defect."' 62  The result is a body of law which declares
that strict liability is a proper basis for shifting the cost of medical
device injuries from the consumer to the seller but which provides
scant guidance as to the standard of responsibility to which product
manufacturers are to be held.
Manufacturers and retailers have been held liable on a strict
liability theory in several medical device cases. 63 Few cases can be
found, however, in which sellers have been held strictly liable when
liability could not also have been imposed on a negligence basis.64
In theory, strict liability is available as a basis of recovery against
manufacturers and retailers, but uncertain and varying standards ap-
plied by the judiciary make the outcome speculative at best.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A formulation also is
difficult to apply to hospitals and physicians. Section 402A refers to
(b) the user . . . has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment a (1965).
58. The doctrine of strict liability developed as a response to the growing number of
cases in which consumers, unwittingly injured by a product, could not recover for their injuries
due to their inability to prove negligence on the part of the retailer. Courts devised strict
liability to circumvent the obstacles traditionally confronting plaintiffs and to insure that the
party who initially placed the dangerous product in the stream of commerce and stood to profit
from its use would also bear the responsibility for any damages the product caused. See
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
59. Cf. Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Farr v.
Armstrong Rubber Corp., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
60. Cf. Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Pyatt v. Engel Equip., Inc.,
17 Il1. App. 3d 1070, 309 N.E.2d 225 (1974).
61. The most noted case rejecting the use of the complete phrase was the California
Supreme Court's decision in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen, Inc., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
62. HURSH AND BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2D, 4:12 (1974).
63. See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); McKasson v.
Zimmer Mfg. Co., 12 Ill. App. 3d 429, 299 N.E.2d 38 (1973).
64. Posner, supra note 13, at 61.
"one who sells any product" and requires the seller to be "engaged
in the business of selling such a product.65 Most courts have rejected
the classification of doctors or hospitals as sellers engaged in the
business of selling a product 66 but there is authority to the con-
trary.67 The question remains whether hospitals and physicians
should be liable because they use or supply defective medical devices
if the plaintiff is unable to prove negligence. 68  The answer to this
question depends on the applicability to hospitals and doctors of the
policy concerns that have led courts to develop liability without fault
for sellers and retailers.
In certain situations, there are compelling justifications for im-
posing strict liability on hospitals. First, liability should be placed
on the party best able to absorb and spread the cost of the injury.69
Hospitals are now "big business"7 0 with substantial assets and the
concomitant ability to absorb the cost of injuries caused by defective
products used in treating patients.7" Even if the hospital alone could
not realistically distribute the loss to the consumer, it could avoid
liability by impleading the distributor or manufacturer of the medi-
cal device as a third party defendant. Alternatively, the hospital
could seek indemnification or contribution from the manufacturer.
A hospital that fails to maintain adequate records of the source of
each medical device subsequently supplied to a patient should be
held strictly liable, like other links in the distribution chain would
65. Supra note 56.
66. The two leading decisions in this area are Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal.
App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971) and Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d
539 (1967). Both of these cases were decided on the theory that physicians and hospitals are
providers of services rather than sellers of goods. In both, the court concluded that the policy
considerations did not justify an extension of strict liability to doctors and hospitals. See also
Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972); Shivers v. Good Sheperd
Hosp., Inc., 427 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
67. Grubb v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 255 Pa. Super. 381, 387 A.2d 480 (1978);
Hoffman v. Misericordia Hosp. of Phila., 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970); Cunningham v.
MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 64 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970); Jackson v. Muhlenberg
Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967).
68. The following reasons for refusing to extend strict liability to doctors and hospitals
have been enumerated: (1) Medicine is not an exact science. Patients' responses are unpre-
dictable and not within the doctor's control, but manufacturers can achieve stricter controls;
(2) doctors are in the business of furnishing services, not products; (3) a physician must balance
risks against benefits, with some risks being inescapable; (4) doctors' services are individual-
ized and not mass produced. Therefore, it is impossible for doctors to apply a standardized
test for defects; (5) a restrictive effect upon needed medical services would arise if strict liability
were imposed upon doctors. See generally Russell, Product and the Professional- Strict Liabil-
ity in the Sales-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 111 (1972); Note, The Medical
Profession and Strict Liability for Defective Products-A Limited Extension, 17 HASTINGS L.J.
350 (1965).
69. Traditionally, it was felt that providers of services lacked the "deep pocket" and the
large number of customers necessary to spread the cost of consumer injuries. Comment,
Guidelines for Extending Implied Warranties to Service Markets, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 365, 369
(1976); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Lia-
bility for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 809-10 (1976).
70. Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
71. Id at 1067.
be.72
Second, imposing strict liability on the hospital, with its ability
to shift the cost of patient injuries vertically73 to the manufacturer,
will have the positive effect of deterring defects and promoting safety
by placing liability on the party best able to control product quali-
ty.74 Like the manufacturer, the hospital is in a better position than
the patient to discover defective products and to prevent their intro-
duction into public use.
A third concern which supported the development of strict tort
liability was the court's reluctance to foreclose recovery on the basis
of burdensome proof requirements that often made negligence ac-
tions impractical.75 As stated in Thomas v. St. Joseph Hospital,76
"proving negligence on the part of the hospital is generally an ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible task, since the patient has no per-
sonal knowledge of the procedures utilized by the hospital."77
Holding the hospital strictly liable overcomes this obstacle since it is
generally in a better position to identify the other parties involved.78
The hospital may be the only party available for suit because the
manufacturer may be unknown7 9 or beyond the court's
jurisdiction."0
72. A hospital with an "Implanted Device Control Center" would have a record of the
manufacturer of any device causing injury and could place the loss where it properly belongs.
Surely the hospital, as opposed to the injured plaintiff, is better able to find the manufacturer
and obtain indemnification. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
73. "Vertical cost shift" refers to distributing the cost of a defect from the ultimate con-
sumer to all parties along the distributive chain from the immediate seller up to and including
the manufacturer. See, e.g., Carlson Mach. Tools, Inc. v. American Tool, Inc., 678 F.2d 1253,
1259 (5th Cir. 1982); Omaha Pollution Control Corp. v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 413 F. Supp.
1069, 1088 (D. Neb. 1976).
74. Strict liability is supported where it will increase a safety incentive and deter unnec-
essary risks. See Grubb v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 255 Pa. Super. 386, 387 A.2d 480
(1978).
75. Cf. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462-63, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring). See generally Dickerson, The ABCs of Products Liability--With a
Close Look at Section 402,4 and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REV. 439, 440-41 (1969).
76. 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
77. Id at 793.
78. It is well known that nurses keep excellent logs, containing almost every minute de-
tail of the patient's stay in the hospital. Id. at 794.
79. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
80. In the medical instrument and device area the problem of obtaining jurisdiction over
a given manufacturer may be acute. Many manufacturers sell their products to independent
distributors who often only do mail order business within the state. If the manufacturer has no
agent soliciting business in the state and only passively accepts orders from within the state,
courts have regularly determined that such action was not sufficient to constitute "doing busi-
ness." See, e.g., Gill v. Surgitool, Inc., 256 Cal. App. 2d 583, 64 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1967); Heberle
v. P.R.O. Liquidating Co., 186 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1966); Cooke-Waite Laboratories v. Napier,
166 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1964); Smith v. American Cystoscope Makers, 44 Wash. 2d 202, 266 P2.d
792 (1954). The trend in most jurisdictions, however, is toward adoption of long-arm statutes
and judicial recognition of the "minimum contacts" theory which somewhat alleviates this
problem. For a discussion of common law jurisdictional requirements see Hanson v. Denkla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). These juris-
dictional problems can be compounded if the original manufacturer no longer exists. See, e.g.,
Consequently, there is little or no reason to carve out an excep-
tion to the doctrine of strict liability for hospitals in all instances.
The doctrine originated in response to a public demand that applies
with even greater force in today's technological society, that the bur-
den of accidental injuries caused by products introduced into the
marketplace fall upon those marketing them. When a patient is in-
jured by a device supplied by the hospital and the original manufac-
turer cannot be found, the hospital should be strictly liable.8
B. Adequacy of the Three Theories of Recovery
The three theories of recovery presently used in products liabil-
ity are inadequate both from the plaintiff's point of view and the
defendant's. From the plaintiff's perspective, the negligence action is
available against all potential defendants, but its effectiveness is lim-
ited by burdensome proof requirements.82 Courts often refuse to ap-
ply breach of warranty theories against hospitals and doctors even
though the manufacturer is unavailable for suit.83 Strict liability,
originally devised to circumvent problems in maintaining successful
claims, is erratically defined and inconsistently applied.84 From a
defendant's point of view, there is no uniform standard by which to
measure the responsibility required to avoid liability.
Products liability law must be clarified and simplified. A prod-
uct must be judged by the same standard regardless of the place in
which it happens to be marketed. There exists an urgent and com-
pelling need for a uniform products liability system and a definite
standard by which to determine liability.
III. Proposed Reform-The Uniform Products Liability Act of
1979
A. Four Categories of Defective Products Under the UPL4
On October 13, 1979, the Department of Commerce, through its
Task Force on Products Liability and Accident Compensation, is-
sued the Model Uniform Product Liability Act.85 The stated objec-
tives of the UPLA are to resolve various problem areas in the
product liability field including liability insurance, unsafe manufac-
Cinocca v. Baxter Lab, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Okla. 1974), a'd, 100 F. Supp. 527 (E.D.
Okla. 1975). See also Bayer v. Sarot, 51 App. Div. 2d 366, 381 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1976).
81. But see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 13, 25-27 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 37.
84. See supra notes 56, 60-62 and accompanying text.
85. Model Uniform Products Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as UPLA].
turing practices, and uncertainties in the tort litigation system.86
According to the UPLA task force, the most controversial issue
in products liability is the basic standard of responsibility to which
product manufacturers are to be held.87 In its quest for the proper
basis of liability, the UPLA rejects the all-purpose definition of strict
liability found in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.88 UPLA
Section 104 then sets forth the criteria to be used in evaluating prod-
uct defects. The Act divides product defects into four functional cat-
egories and provides that a product may be proven defective only if
one of the following criteria is met: (1) It was unreasonably unsafe
in construction; or (2) it was unreasonably unsafe in design; or (3) it
was unreasonably unsafe because adequate warnings or instructions
were not provided; or (4) it was unreasonably unsafe because it did
not conform to the product seller's express warranty.89 Two different
standards of responsibility are applied within these four categories.
Strict liability applies to defects in construction and breach of an
express warranty9 ° and negligence alone applies to design defects
and failure to provide adequate warnings. 9'
There is no doubt that some type of uniform product liability
law is needed, but the UPLA's solution is inadequate for a number
of reasons when applied to medical products liability litigation.
92
The UPLA seeks to eradicate the doctrinal differences between neg-
ligence, warranty, and strict liability by treating the basis of liability
differently for each functional category.93 Unfortunately, the UPLA
does little to clarify products liability law because the three theories
are reintroduced into the Act under various sections.94
86. Id at § 101. Product liability rules are constantly changing in each of the fifty juris-
dictions. Many courts have come to regard products liability law as nothing more than a
compensation device for injured consumers. The tort litigation system was not designed to
serve this purpose. Jobe, The Model Uniform Products Liability Act-Basic Standards of Re-
sponsibility for Manufacturers, 46 J. AIR. L. COM. 389 (1981).
87. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (1979). The task force concluded that this problem stems from
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A's focus primarily on manufacturing defects, which
do not present much of a problem, and not on defects concerning conscious design choices or
the duty to warn. Id at 62,715.
88. See supra note 56.
89. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (1979).
90. Id at 62,722.
91. Id.
92. The UPLA's imposition of two separate standards to four clearly defined categories
of product "defects" appears to achieve some compromise between the manufacturer and the
consumer. See generally Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56
N.C.L. REV. 643 (1978).
93. See Twerski and Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Act-A Rush
to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Twerski,4 Rush to Judgment].
94. The drafters, in adopting a tort-compensation approach, chose to follow the state of
product liability law in virtually every jurisdiction. Fault, as manifested by an "unreasonably
unsafe" defective product, not the act of manufacturing a product which injures, is the Act's
basis for recovery. UPLA § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (1979). A product which deviates from
the manufacturer's self-established standards is by definition unreasonably unsafe. Id How-
ever, because no single standard was considered appropriate for manufacturer's choices re-
1. Construction Defects. -It is generally agreed that strict lia-
bility should be imposed for defects in construction.95 Before a man-
ufacturer can be held responsible under a strict liability theory, a
standard must be established to which an allegedly defective product
can be compared. The UPLA states that the manufacturer himself
should provide this standard and that deviations from the self-estab-
lished plans or specifications render the product defective.96
This approach is an unsatisfactory mechanism for establishing
the responsibilities of the medical device manufacturer. A standard
that judges a manufacturer by his own standards, rather than those
of the industry, could penalize the manufacturer who goes out of his
way to build into his product a high safety level not mandated or
followed by the industry.97 The UPLA self-regulation approach also
lacks the flexibility necessary to enable medical device manufactur-
ers to produce the most efficacious product. It is inevitable, for ex-
ample, that certain structural irregularities or flaws will appear in
any metallic structure.98 Some manufacturers may choose to allow
these irregularities to enhance certain other desirable properties of
the structure.99 In these instances, a standard imposed on the indus-
try as a whole would be more relevant than self-regulation in deter-
mining whether the manufacturer should be subject to liability."°°
Risk-utility analysis'' is a preferable industry-wide standard
for recognizing defective products and imposing strict liability.
0 2 If
the usefulness and desirability of the product outweigh the likeli-
hood of injury, it should be sufficient that the manufacturer has met
the industry's standards rather than the higher standards he has im-
garding design and warning, these are judged by a risk-benefit analysis. Id at 62,722. This
division again closely tracks common law. See generally Dworkin, Product Liability Reform
and the Model Uniform Products Liability Act, 60 NEB. L. REV. 50 (1981).
95. The manufacturer has complete control of the construction process, and there is little
a consumer can do to protect himself from such defects. A construction defect is an inadvertent
aberration in the manufacturing or construction process. Henderson, Product Liability, 3
CORP. L. REV. 242 (1980).
96. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
97. See Weinstein, Twersk, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability. An Interaction ofLaw
and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 425, 433-34 n.14 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Weinstein,
Product Liability]. The interplay between quality control and design must be carefully as-
sessed. A manufacturer may choose to manufacture a high quality product and reduce quality
control since even deviations from the norm would not bring the safety level below the accept-
able level. A legal standard which penalizes deviations from quality control norms thus could
influence a decision in favor of greater quality control at the expense of higher overall product
quality. See Twerski, A Rush to Judgment, supra note 93, at 225.
98. Weinstein, Product Liability, supra note 97, at 430 n. 11.
99. Additional elements often are added intentionally to form alloys that are stronger
than the parent metal. Brass is an example of a substitutional solid solution produced by the
addition of zinc and copper. Id. This might be relevant to devices like IUDs and metal bone
pins.
100. Jobe, supra note 86, at 400.
101. Such an analysis weighs the product's benefits against its real or potential risks. For a
summary of various factors in risk-utility analysis see infra note 147 and accompanying text.
102. Weinstein, Product Liability, supra note 97.
posed on himself1 °3 Thus, if the risk-utility analysis falls in the
manufacturer's favor, and if the product meets industry construction
standards, the product is not defective and strict liability should not
be imposed.
2 Design Defects. -The UPLA eschews strict liability as the
governing standard for design defect cases'0 4 and endorses the lower
negligence standard."0 5 Under the UPLA, the trier of fact is re-
quired to balance various risk-utility factors 0 6 to determine whether
liability should attach. Surprisingly, the UPLA imposes the burden
of proof in this balancing approach upon the injured plaintifli' °7
The plaintiff is required to show that, in light of the risk-utility anal-
ysis, the product was unreasonably unsafe in design. Accomplishing
all this, the plaintiff has only proved a breach of the duty of care
rather than strict liability.
This approach is unacceptable in today's highly complex and
technological society. The plaintiff who is injured by a defective
medical device is rarely prepared to meet this monumental burden
of proof.'0 s Unlike the manufacturer, who is in a position to dis-
cover and evaluate inherent dangers, the plaintiff has neither the ex-
pertise nor the means to investigate and prove the soundness or
unsoundness of a particular product."°9
103. It is not generally desirable to judge a manufacturer by his own standard. See supra
note 97.
104. Design defects stem from the intended result of the manufacturing process. Phillips,
The Standardfor Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 101, 103
(1977). A design defect usually affects the manufacturer's entire line of products and results
from a conscious choice of the manufacturer based on his desire to balance the need for safety
against factors like utility, attractiveness, and cost.
105. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (1979). See supra note 13.
106. Section 104(B) of the UPLA provides,
In determining whether the product was defective, the trier of fact shall consider
whether an alternative design should have been utilized, in light of:
(1) the likelihood at the time of manufacture that the product would cause the
harm suffered by the claimant;
(2) the seriousness of that harm;
(3) the technological feasibility of manufacturing a product designed so as to
have prevented claimant's harm;
(4) the relative costs of producing, distributing, and selling such an alternative
design; and
(5) the new or additional harms that may result from such an alternative
design.
44 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (1979).
107. Id at 62,723.
108. Cf Justice Traynor's comments in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
461, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
109. Jobe, supra note 86, at 404. The UPLA at least does eliminate the consumer expecta-
tion test in determining whether the product's design is defective. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,723 (1979).
If one envisions such a test in a medical device case, its pitfalls become obvious. The con-
sumer expectation test is extremely subjective, requiring a case by case analysis that takes into
account the age, background, skill and experience of each plaintiff. See RHEINGOLD, What are
the Consumer's "'Reasonable Expectations" 22 Bus. L. 589, 593 (1967). These factors should
be irrelevant in determining whether a manufacturer has marketed a defective product. More-
over, medical device consumers generally have no concrete expectations and often merely set
A strict liability standard, rather than a negligence standard,
should be imposed for design defects. Nevertheless, a manufacturer
should be able to avoid liability if he is able to show that the utility
of his design outweighs its risks, just as with construction defects. " 10
In both contexts, the burden of proving this fact should fall on the
manufacturer rather than on the plaintiff."' Thus, the injured plain-
tiff would have the burden of proving that "something went wrong"
with the product which proximately and in fact caused the injury.
The defendant then could raise the affirmative defense that the risk-
utility balance falls in his favor. Under this approach, the plaintiff
would be relieved of insurmountable proof problems, and the de-
fendant would be made to bear the cost of injury caused by the prod-
uct without becoming an absolute insurer of the product's safety."'
3. Defective Warnings Or Instructions. -The UPLA provides
that a product may be defective if adequate warnings or instructions
are not provided." 3 The Act requires a showing of negligence
before liability can be imposed for failure to warn. 114 The plaintiff,
therefore, must prove that the manufacturer knew or should have
known that harm would be likely to occur in the absence of proper
instructions or warnings. In addition, causation must be established
between the lack of, or inadequacy of, the warning or instructions
and the plaintiffs injuries.
1 5
This causation requirement is of pivotal importance in drug and
medical device cases" l6 that involve the "informed consent" type
warning. With regard to medical devices, a warning cannot function
to reduce the risk level attendant to the use of the product. The
function of a warning in these cases is to inform the consumer of a
their own subjective and often unfounded expectations. To evaluate product defectiveness by
such nebulous standards would allow very poor manufacturing processes to pass muster. See
generally Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products Liabil-
ity Litigation, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1303 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Donaher]. These authors agree
that the perspective of the reasonable consumer should be abandoned. The inquiry instead
should be whether the public would demand a less dangerous product, given the risks, benefits,
and possible alternatives. Id at 1307.
110. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
11. When applying this approach, substance should be given to the terms "unreasonably
dangerous" and "defective." The products liability test would finally reflect the only question
properly at issue: whether the product qua product meets society's standards of acceptability.
Donaher, supra note 109, at 1304.
112. Liability does not depend upon negligence because the plaintiff is not required to
show that the manufacturer engaged in unreasonable conduct and that a reasonable person
would have recognized the unreasonableness at the time the conduct occurred. On the other
hand, liability is not absolute because losses will only be shifted to the seller if he sold a
defective product whose risks outweighed utilities, and which caused plaintiffs injuries. Cf
McClellan, Strict Liabiliyfor Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion Through the Maze of Prod-
ucts Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1978).
113. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (1979).
114. Id
115. Id
116. Twerski, A Rush to Judgment, supra note 93, at 236.
nonreducible risk and to facilitate an informed decision whether to
use the product.'1 7 To prove causation in these cases, the plaintiff
must establish that, if adequate warnings were provided, the product
would not have been used." I8
To adopt a theory which, on the one hand, imposes a duty to
warn of nonreducible risks and, on the other hand, requires the
plaintiff to establish that a "reasonably prudent person" would have
chosen not to use the product is inutile. The purpose of the warning
in these cases is to ensure that the consumer's decision to use the
product is based on intelligent choice." 9 To impose a duty to warn
only when a reasonable person would choose not to use the product
destroys the assurance that the user is acting with informed con-
sent.' 20 The proper test is whether a reasonable consumer would
want the information before deciding to use the product. 12  If the
manufacturer supplies all relevant information under this test, either
to the patient or the doctor, the product is not defective.
4. Breach of Express Warranty. -Breach of the seller's express
warranty is the final vehicle available to establish liability under the
UPLA.' 22 To recover for breach of warranty under the UPLA, a
plaintiff is required to establish the following: (1) The warranty, in
fact, was relied on; (2) a causal connection exists between the harm
incurred and the manufacturer's representations; and (3) the war-
ranty was directed toward the plaintiff.
23
These requirements only muddy a relatively clear area of prod-
ucts liability law by not explicitly waiving privity. 24 Although the
Act imputes reliance to a husband or wife,' 25 it is unclear whether
the concept of imputed reliance is limited to members of the pur-
117. Most patients never see the warnings that accompany a medical device. The manu-
facturer's duty to warn is discharged if the doctor is fully advised of the accompanying risks.
The duty to warn the patient then shifts to the doctor. See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Don-
aher & Piehler, The Use andAbuse of Warnings in Products Liability, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Warnings].
118. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (1979).
119. Twerski, 4 Rush to Judgment, supra note 93, at 236.
120. Id at 237.
121. This test was recently articulated in Miller v. Kennedy, I I Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d
852, aff'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975), in which the court described the duty of a
doctor to disclose risks as follows:
The scope of the duty to disclose information concerning the treatment proposed,
other treatments and the risk of each course of action and of no treatment at all is
measured by the patient's need to know. The inquiry. . . is, 'Would the patient as a
human being consider this item in choosing his or her course of treatment?'
Id at 274, 530 P.2d at 854.
122. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,725 (1979).
123. Id
124. The requirement of privity as a prerequisite to recovery for breach of an express
warranty has been dispensed with in most jurisdictions. See supra note 35, and accompanying
text.
125. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,722 (1979).
chaser's immediate family or whether it can be extended to others,
like surgeons and physicians. Thus, even though many courts have
eliminated the privity requirement in breach of warranty claims,
26
the Act may result in denying recovery to the injured plaintiff if reli-
ance from the doctor cannot be imputed. The plaintiff is the ulti-
mate purchaser of a medical device. Because the plaintiff does not
generally purchase the device directly from the manufacturer, it is
impossible to rely on an express warranty in making the purchase.
The Act should make it clear that the doctor is a purchasing agent
and that reliance will be imputed to the patient.
B. Is the UPLA the Answer?
Though some form of uniform products liability law is needed,
the UPLA's approach of applying a negligence standard to certain
types of defects and strict liability to others' 27 only perpetuates the
confusion surrounding products liability law. Strict liability should
be imposed regardless of whether the injury resulted from a manu-
facturing defect, a design defect, a defective warning or instruc-
tion, 28 or a breach of an express warranty. 29  Imposing strict
liability for all types of defects would correctly focus the inquiry on
the adequacy of the product as marketed rather than on the conduct
of the manufacturer. The policy considerations justifying the impo-
sition of strict liability 3 ' apply regardless of why the product was
defective.
Strict liability also should be applied against parties other than
the manufacturer. The UPLA's approach in this context is admira-
ble. Section 105 provides that if the product manufacturer is not
subject to service of process or has been judicially declared insolvent,
the retailer, wholesaler, or distributor bears the same strict liability
obligations as the manufacturer. 3 ' Thus, the liability of physicians
126. See supra notes 35 and 124.
127. Negligence is applied to design defects and failure to warn while strict liability is
imposed for construction defects and breach of express warranties. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (1979).
128. The strict liability standard in defective warning cases would be formulated differ-
ently from the standard for determining defective design or manufacture. For an explanation
of the test, see supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
129. This would merely be a continuation of the current common law practice. See, e.g.,
Awedian v. Theodore Efron Mfg. Co., 66 Mich. App. 353, 239 N.W.2d 611 (1976) (plaintiff
need only show existence of defect and causal relationship to injury); Sheeskin v. Giant Foods,
Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974) (no need to show negligence in warranty case);
Tully v. Empire Equip. Co., 28 A.2d 935, 282 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1967) (instruction given in terms
of negligence and reasonable care was erroneous). See generally Hofford, The Limits of Strict
Liabilityfor Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEX. L. REv. 81, 84 (1973).
130. Among the several grounds suggested for imposition of strict liability, the most com-
pelling ones are loss distribution and injury reduction. Stuaan and Brittingham, Hospital
Amenity to Tort Liability, 2 J. LEG. MED. 365 (1981).
131. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,727. Case law suggests that these nonmanufacturer product sellers
usually can shift their costs to the manufacturer through indemnity suits. See, e.g., Anderson
v. Somberg, 158 N.J. Super. 384, 397, 386 A.2d 413, 419-20 (1978); Litton Systems, Inc. v.
and hospitals for causes of action other than negligence is limited to
instances in which recovery from the manufacturer is effectively
foreclosed.' 32 This approach insures that the loss will fall first on the
party that can absorb or spread the loss, 1 33 rather than on the injured
plaintiff who is least able to cope with the loss. But how is the strict
liability standard to be formulated?
IV. Toward A Workable Solution
A. How Strict Is Strict Liability?
To date, case law reveals widespread confusion concerning the
proper standard for the imposition of strict liability.' 34 Plaintiffs
rarely file medical device products liability claims without asserting
both negligence and strict liability, 35 and the courts typically re-
spond by consciously or unconsciously merging the two theories.' 36
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A contains the most
widely applied standard of strict liability. 137  Liability is predicated
on a finding that the product is "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous 38 to the user or consumer."'' 39 The comments following
Shaw's Sales and Service Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10, 13, 579 P.2d 48, 50 (1978). See also supra notes
72-74.
132. Procedurally, if the claimant commences an action against the physician or hospital
based on a theory other than their own negligence, the defendant could make a motion for
dismissal. The claimant then would have the burden of showing that the manufacturer was
unavailable or insolvent. If the action were dismissed, the claimant would retain the right to
proceed against the manufacturer. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,727.
133. In order for UPLA Section 105 to operate fairly toward claimants as well as
nonmanufacturer product sellers, it is suggested that,
(1) the non-manufacturer product seller should be treated as a party for purposes of
discovery under the applicable procedural code. Otherwise, the Act may place
an undue burden on the claimant attempting to maintain a claim.
(2) the statute of limitations vis-a-vis the nonmanufacturer product seller should be
deemed to have tolled in case the claimant is unable to enforce the product
liability judgment against the manufacturer.
44 Fed. Reg. 62,727.
134. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 433, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 238 (1978) (Restatement § 402A's "unreasonably dangerous" test would require the
plaintiff to prove negligence); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d
1033, 1036 (1974) (negligence with imputed knowledge standard); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (absolute liability).
135. D. GINGERICH, supra note 12, at 18.
136. A good example of how the courts have confused the theories is the case of Vergott v.
Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972), in which an attempt to hold the
distributor and the hospital liable under § 402A was unsuccessful. In a confused discussion
the court said that neither breached a duty, even though § 402A does not refer to duty. Id. at
16.
137. See supra note 56. For recent compilations by jurisdiction see 2 L. FRUMER AND M.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16[3] at 3-238 n.2 (1975).
138. The term "unreasonably dangerous" has caused a great deal of dissatisfaction. See,
e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g. Co., 220 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978);
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1158, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
The term was originally proposed by Dean Prosser in an early draft of § 402A as the sole
standard of liability. The "defect" aspect was only added at the urging of the American Law
Institute Council to show that there must be something wrong with the product itself. See 38
section 402A provide that a product is "defective when it is. . .in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer."' 4 ° "Unrea-
sonably dangerous" is described as "dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases [the product], with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics."'
' 4'
Although the Restatement standard properly focuses the exami-
nation on the product in its actual environment of use, it unfortu-
nately does so from the viewpoint of the ordinary consumer. 42 This
approach is particularly inappropriate in medical device litigation
where the consumer generally has little or no prior exposure to the
device and no concrete ideas of how safe the product could be
made. 143
A second formulation of strict liability that has found expres-
sion in several opinions' 44 is that a product is unreasonably danger-
ous, and therefore defective, "when it is so dangerous that a
reasonable man would not sell the product if he knew of the risks
involved." 141 This test, too, is laden with negligence concepts of
foreseeability and reasonableness and is little better than the Re-
statement's consumer expectation test. It does reflect the essence of
strict liability by asking, not whether the reasonable seller should
have known of the risks, but whether he would have sold the product
if he had known. 146  Nevertheless, evaluation of the product from
the seller's viewpoint fatally skews the result since he may well
choose to market an unacceptably dangerous product and absorb the
ALl PROCEEDINGS 78-88 (1961). The Council was concerned about certain products which,
even though not defective, are nevertheless dangerous to the consumer (e.g., cigarettes and
whiskey). Thus "defect" was added to show that it is not enough that the product itself is
dangerous or "unreasonably dangerous." There must be something wrong with the product
itself. One author has suggested that, because Dean Prosser was such a central figure in the
analysis and development of negligence law, he used the "unreasonably dangerous" test with
which he was familiar and which he had found workable. See generally Vandall, "Design
Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 61,
73 (1982).
139. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965).
141. Id at comment a.
142. The UPLA rejected the consumer expectation test. See supra note 109 and infra note
143 and accompanying text.
143. In addition to being rejected by the UPLA, the consumer expectation test has been
criticized by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Wade, On the Nature ofStrict Tort Liability
for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829 (1973). See also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973).
145. Id at 253. This test originated in Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability. The Meaning of
"Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969). See
also Keeton, Products Liability, Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 407-09
(1970).
146. Whether a reasonable person in the position of the seller would have foreseen a par-
ticular risk of harm to the consumer is irrelevant in a strict liability claim. McClellan, supra
note 11, at 3.
cost of occasional injuries caused by it.' 47
A third possibility for measuring defectiveness is by an objective
standard, like governmental or administrative safety regulations. At
present, no such regulations exist in the medical device area.
4 8
The starting point for a resolution of the strict liability labyrinth
is the abandonment of the term "unreasonably dangerous" from any
strict liability standard.'49 This term is nothing more than a require-
ment that the product be defective. 5° The unreasonably dangerous
element is established by proving a defect and that the defect caused
an injury.
The question of a product's "defectiveness," however, does not
end the inquiry. Strict liability is not synonomous with absolute as-
surance of a product's safety.'' The question is whether, given the
risks, benefits, and possible alternatives to the product, society will
accept the product in its existing state, or require an altered, safer
form.'52 This fundamentally is a risk-utility analysis. Suggested
147. Several other standards have been advanced for determining a defect for strict liabil-
ity purposes. For example, Deans Keeton and Wade advocate a risk-utility balancing ap-
proach. See Keeton, Products Liabilityj-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CuM.
L. REV. 293, 313 (1979); see also Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825 (1973). The Wade and Keeton formulations appear to be substantially the
same, except that Keeton would impute knowledge of dangers to the manufacturer at the time
of trial, while Wade would impute only the knowledge existing at the time the product was
sold. Professor Calabresi has proposed an economic test for strict liability which advocates
holding the cheapest cost avoider liable. See Calabresi, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1077 (1977). Professor Richard Epstein developed a strict liability
theory based upon causation. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151,
165 (1973).
148. With the exception of drugs, realistic federal regulation of medical devices was virtu-
ally nonexistent until 1976 when Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments to the
Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938. See supra note 2. The amendments seek to provide
"reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness" for all devices. For a detailed discussion of
how medical devices are classified and evaluated under the MDA see Safir, FDA Regulations
and Product Liability, 36 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 478 (1981); Mahinka, The Setting of Stan-
dards. Concern for Medical Device Regulation, 35 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 244 (1981). See also
Foote, supra note 5. Although the MDA makes provisions for the establishment, amendment,
and revocation ofperformance standards, no such provisions are provided for the establish-
ment of safety standards. While failure to comply with a safety standard may be prima facie
evidence of negligence, failure to comply with a performance standard is not. See W. PRos-
SER, supra note 13, at § 36, at 203.
149. A minority of courts already have realized that this term causes more harm than
good and have declared that "unreasonably dangerous" simply should not be applied to a
strict liability claim. See, e.g., Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893
(1975); Anderson v. Fairchild-Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976 (D. Alaska, 1973); Glass v. Ford
Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp., 8 Cal. 3d
121, 133-34, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
150. A defect exists whenever the product fails to meet society's standards of acceptability.
Weinstein, Product Liability, supra note 97.
151. McClellan, supra note 112, at 19-21.
152. This risk-utility theory would find its principal application in questions of design
defect. The balancing of factors has no real relevance in the analysis of a manufacturing
defect because the product has not met the manufacturer's production standards. The balanc-
ing already would have been done when deciding the production standards. In these situa-
tions, the inquiry ends after a determination of defectiveness, and strict liability applies. See
Keeton, supra note 147.
guidelines for evaluation under this standard include: the usefulness
and desirability of the product; the availability of other safer prod-
ucts to meet the same needs; the likelihood and probable seriousness
of injury; the adequacy of the warnings, for both use and "informed
consent"; 53 and the ability to eliminate the danger without impair-
ing the product's usefulness or making it unduly expensive.'54
There should be one strict liability standard that reflects a bal-
ance of the complex risk-utility factors which, when combined, de-
termine a product's acceptability.'"I Under the proposed standard,
the negligence-laden concepts of the reasonable consumer and rea-
sonable seller properly would be eliminated, and the manufacturer
would know in advance the standard by which his product will be
judged.
B. Products Liability Adjudication-5tWho Decides?
Much attention in the past has been focused on the question of
what substantive rules ought to govern products liability. 156 In con-
trast, little has been written on the unique involvement and limita-
tions of the courts 157 in developing and implementing a products
liability litigation system.
The traditional adjudication process no longer is adequate as a
mechanism for handling many of the disputes engendered by our
complex technological society. The inherent disabilities of
presenting technical material beyond the comprehension of the lay
mind to juries is compounded by the adversary system, which has
fostered the use of partisan experts who, consciously or uncon-
sciously, tend to slant their testimony to their party's advantage.
59
153. See supra notes 109 and Ill and accompanying text.
154. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.W.L.J. 5, 17 (1965).
155. As evidenced by the widespread confusion in and dissatisfaction with strict products
liability, the present standard of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A is inadequate. See
supra note 56. The American Law Institute should rewrite the strict liability standard to re-
flect a balance of all relevant risk-utility considerations. The standard should not, however, set
forth the specific weight to be given to different elements of the test. This determination must
be made on a product by product, case by case basis.
156. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choices: The Limits
of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973).
157. Points concerning the limitations of the courts in the product liability field include
the following: (1) courts cannot second-guess experts working in the industry; (2) courts are
reactive agencies that must wait for cases to come to them; (3) courts are unable adequately to
investigate and understand the complex technological issues brought before them; (4) courts
impose a variety of standards causing a lack of uniformity. Id at 1532-33.
158. Some commentators have argued that scientific and technical disputes fall completely
outside the limits of judicial competence and that courts should limit themselves to reviewing
the adequacy of procedures for analyzing and collecting scientific evidence. Judge Bazelon,
for example, has suggested that courts reviewing decisions of administrative agencies can do
no more than verify that the major issues are addressed and that decisions are based on all
relevant factors. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 817 (1977).
159. The Prettyman Committee noted that "the traditional method of proof [by expert
The presentation of massive, undigested, technical data, complex
and contradictory medical testimony, or raw figures and elaborate
computations only confuse the jury16 and reduce the likelihood of a
just and accurate factual determination based on the evidence
presented. 16
Some have argued that courts simply cannot adjudicate com-
plex products liability issues. 162  These cases typically raise, along
with the complex technical issues regarding the product itself, ques-
tions of strict liability, negligence, causation, and respondeat supe-
rior. The appropriate forum for these questions is before a court and
jury. 163  It is doubtful that some other type of legal forum, perhaps
an arbitration board or administrative tribunal, could assume the
task."64 The structure of the litigation process, however, must be
changed to accommodate the crucial role of expertise in evaluating,
as opposed to merely presenting, the complicated scientific issues oc-
casioned by modem technology. How can this be accomplished?
A medical device products liability case cannot be tried without
a comprehensive understanding of both the product and the environ-
ment of its use. 165 The trial court must focus initially on the product
and the technology involved in its manufacture, rather than on the
injury and its hypothetical avoidance, which is the current focus.
16 6
To accomplish this, the use of a seriated trial 167  has been
suggested. 168
The first phase of the trial would be a non-jury process focusing
witnesses] when applied to . . .[complex] issues is cumbersome, unnecessarily time consum-
ing, and uncertain in its results." Prettyman Report, 13 F.R.D. 62, 79 (1951).
160. As long ago as 1901, Learned Hand discussed the anomaly of asking a lay judge and
jury to resolve a dispute between experts on a subject about which they know nothing other
than what the experts have told them. Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding
Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901).
161. See Jasanoff and Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits o/Judicial Competence,
22 JURIMETRIES J. 266, 274 (1982).
162. See supra note 158.
163. Rosenn, Litigation Involving Manufacturers' Liabilityfor Defective Medical Products.
Judicial Perspectives, 2 AM. J.L. MED. 245, 249 (1977).
164. Id at 247.
165. Twerski, Warnings, supra note 117. This is especially true in design defect litigation.
166. At present, the issue in products liability cases is cast in terms of whether an injury
could have been avoided had the product been designed differently. This approach is too
simplistic because it ignores the real considerations of balancing cost, risk, utility, aesthetics
and marketability of the product. See Rosenn, supra note 163.
167. A seriated trial is a trial in four stages (an expansion of the present bifurcated trial) in
which evidence is marshalled more intelligently and experts utilized more effectively. Id
168. Weinstein, Product Liability, supra note 97, at 426. While the seriated trial would
serve as an effective mechanism in products liability litigation, certain modifications in the
idea, as proposed, need to be made. It has been suggested that the trial commence with an
expanded pre-trial process focusing on the critical issue of product behavior and immediately
involving each party's expert witnesses. The second phase would be a jury trial focusing on
the product itself with the sole issue being whether the product is "defective." If the jury finds
the product to be defective, the trial before the jury would shift to the third and fourth phases
to resolve the issue of causation and damages. See Weinstein, Products Liability, supra note 97
and Rosenn, supra note 163.
on the technological aspects of the medical device (or other product).
This phase essentially would be a technology assessment phase. De-
sirable aspects would be weighed against the undesirable ones, in-
cluding, to the extent possible, effects that are uncertain. Modified
and alternate approaches to achieving the same benefits would be
evaluated in light of predictions regarding the future technology of
the product and possible controls on future development.' 69
The tool necessary to implement phase one already exists. Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) allows issues to be tried by a jury
to be referred to a "master" 7 ' if they are "complicated."'' This
procedure would clarify complex issues for speedy and just determi-
nation by judge and jury and, at the same time, preserve a party's
right to a trial by jury.
In a jury case this referral is solely to clarify the facts and issues
to be presented to the jury. The jury remains the ultimate arbiter of
the facts. 72 The "master's" findings, if accepted by the court, consti-
tute merely prima facie evidence to be submitted to the jury for
consideration. 1
73
Rather than refer the case to one "master," the court should
delegate the scientific fact-finding task to a panel of scientific ex-
perts 174 representing the disciplines relevant to the issue being de-
169. See generally Comment, The Role of the Courts in Technology Assessment, 55 COR-
NELL L. REV. 86 (1970). This is essentially where the risk-benefit test advocated previously is
applied to determine the product's defectiveness.
170. The term "master" includes a "referee, an auditor, an examiner, a commissioner, an
assessor," which broadly defined could include "scientific examiners." FED. R. Civ. P. 53. See
also Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
509 (1974).
171. In nonjury cases referrals may only be made to masters under "exceptional condi-
tions." A comparison of the two criteria reveals that the "complicated issue" standard is, by
far, less restrictive. Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts.- Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452
(1958).
Rather than delegating this assessment to each party's witness, as previously proposed,
this procedure avoids the partisanship and polarity fostered by adversarial expert witnesses.
172. This procedure should be distinguished from the use of court appointed experts for
purposes of providing neutral testimony. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 17 (2d ed. 1972).
The master usually holds hearings, receives material evidence, permits cross-examination, and
gives both parties an opportunity to be heard. He then prepares a written report of his findings
and conclusions. Both parties then submit objections to the points of law in the report. The
report as accepted may then be read to the jury. When a neutral court-appointed expert is
utilized, the parties' experts present their testimony to the court in the first instance, and the
neutral expert merely testifies as a witness for the court subject to full examination by both
parties. See Kaufman, supra note 168, at 640 n.43.
173. For cases in which masters have been employed see Connecticut Importing Co. v.
Frankfurt Distilleries, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 225 (D. Conn. 1940); Coyner v. United States, 103 F.2d
629 (7th Cir. 1939).
174. The panel of experts could be organized in at least the four following ways: (1) It
could be organized as a permanent or ad hoc advisory board of independent experts, similar to
the National Institute of Health and Natural Science Foundation review boards assembling
and working only as required. Ad hoc boards could be constituted in terms of the specializa-
tions needed at the time. A permanent board would have to be representative of all scientific
disciplines. It would be quite large and would have to function via a committee structure. Ad
hoc committees could supplement permanent committees to deal with unusual issues. Mem-
cided. The panel would serve a function analogous to that of the
"science court" originally proposed as long ago as 1967.' The
panel of experts would function in the same capacity as a "master"
by providing the court with a complete account of existing evidence,
assessing the soundness of the research underlying the various find-
ings, and reporting on the relative support of the findings in the
scholarly community. 7 6 The expert's report would conclude with a
balanced appraisal of the issues at hand.
The second phase of the seriated trial would be a jury trial fo-
cusing exclusively on the product and the issue of defectiveness. Ide-
ally, this would involve a consideration of the design, function,
purpose, and overall medical and social use of the product, taking
into account the factors previously proposed for defining the param-
eters of defectiveness. 77  By focusing solely on the alleged defect
during this phase of the trial, the jury could effectively balance and
evaluate the factors involved in a strict liability analysis without any
bias or sympathy for the plaintiff's injuries.
Phase one and two, as proposed, constitute a major deviation
from present products liability litigation. This deviation neverthe-
less would be an improvement because it would allow assessment of
the product by technological experts in the particular field involved
and a social policy determination of acceptability by the society that
must live with or without the product.
bers would be paid on a consultant basis for work performed. A crucial issue for the success of
an advisory board would be the perceived and actual neutrality of its members in respect to
the litigation before the court; (2) the body of experts could be organized as a "science court"
in full time service. A science court would have a regular budget, and its members would have
employee status. It would not be part of the regular court structure. Funding might be a
regular item in the federal budget. The services of the science court probably would not be
restricted to the legal system but would be available to all branches of government. Because a
science court is likely to develop a bureaucratic structure and a variety of organizational goals,
strict litigational neutrality may be more difficult to achieve than in an independent advisory
board; (3) experts could be organized as the research office of the court, the scientist members
being regular court employees paid out of the court's budget. This office would function to
collect and evaluate findings. While such an officer would be more quickly responsive to the
needs of the court, it is not likely to inspire the same confidence in its neutrality or have the
same prestige as an advisory board or science court; (4) finally, experts could be organized as
an office of a governmental agency other than the court, like the Department of Justice. Staff
and functions would be similar to a research office of the court. However, doubts are likely to
exist regarding the neutrality of an agency-affiliated office of scientific experts. Sperlich, Social
Science Evidence and the Courts: Reaching Beyond the Adversary Process, 63 JUDICATURE 280
(1980).
175. Dr. Arthur Krantrowitz has lobbied actively for the creation of such a court for more
than a decade. See Dr. Krantrowitz, Address delivered before the Subcomm. on Gov. Re-
search, Senate Comm. on Gov. Operations (March 16, 1967), reprinted in, 113 CONG. REC.
15,256 (1967). See also Krantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically 63 AM. Sci. 505
(1975).
176. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. For an in-depth view of the proposed
science court, see generally Cooper, Scientists and Lawyers in the Legal Process, 36 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 9 (1981); Bazelon, supra note 158; Commoner, A Supreme Courtfor Sci-
ence, HOSPITAL PRACTICE (April 1976); Casper, Technology, Policy and Democracy: Is the
Proposed Science Court What We Need, 194 Sci. 29 (1976); Krantrowitz, supra note 175.
177. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
If the jury decides that the product is not defective, the trial
would be complete after phase two. If, however, the product is judg-
ed defective, phase three would be implemented. The third phase
would be confined to a presentation and evaluation of evidence of
the facts surrounding the injury for a resolution of the causation is-
sue. If causation is established, strict liability would attach at this
phase. The fourth and final phase then would be devoted to a deter-
mination of damages.
V. Conclusion
The ingenuity of man has increased daily the number and so-
phistication of medical devices used to prolong and improve pa-
tients' lives. Unfortunately, many new and often unforeseen risks
also have been inadvertently created. Products liability law must be
reevaluated, simplified and modified to keep pace with the advances
in medical technology. The present theories of negligence, warranty,
and strict liability are inadequate as mechanisms of recovery for a
plaintiff injured by a defective medical device. A plaintiff must be
able to use the strict liability doctrine against not only the manufac-
turer, but also against the hospital or doctor if the manufacturer is
not amenable to suit.
A manufacturer, hospital, or doctor must know the standard by
which the products are to be judged. A uniform standard for judg-
ing defects must be developed and implemented. The determination
of liability begins by focusing on some perceived deficiency in the
product. The ultimate conclusion of defectiveness, however, must
emerge as an amalgam of the appropriate elements of a risk-utility
theory. A seriated trial, focusing initially on the product in the envi-
ronment of its use, allows this evaluation to be made accurately and
objectively.
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